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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2010, following failed labor negotiations and facing a 
mounting budget crisis, the Oakland, California, Police Department 
fired eighty police officers and announced that it would no longer  
respond to reports of certain crimes, including burglary, vandalism, 
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theft, and a host of low-level offenses.1  Oakland is not the only com-
munity to have limited—or considered limiting—police services in  
response to local budget woes.  Cities across the country—small and 
large, urban and suburban—have been forced to scale back the size of 
their police forces.  While some have joined Oakland in explicitly pair-
ing budget cuts with service cuts,2 others have vowed to redouble their 
efforts to stretch scarce resources even further.  Upon assuming office, 
for example, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel asked his police chief to 
freeze hiring and cut $190 million from his budget.3  Emanuel, however, 
assured an anxious public that he “remain[ed] committed to putting 
more officers on the streets,” insisting that the budget cuts would 
come from the central office bureaucracy.4  Currently, the Chicago 
Police Department has over 1400 unfilled positions.5  
For obvious reasons, reductions in police force size and service 
levels raise serious questions about public safety, especially in major 
cities.  These reductions also bring to the surface questions about  
policing priorities, including the debate over so-called “order-
maintenance policing” policies, which have, over the past few decades, 
refocused police resources on restoring order in urban public spaces 
following years of relative neglect.6  An important catalyst for this “order-
maintenance revolution” was the 1982 publication of James Q. Wilson 
and George Kelling’s influential essay, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, which urged urban leaders to reassert authority 
over, and restore order to, urban public spaces.7  But it is fair to say 
that, by the time Wilson and Kelling published Broken Windows, many 
 
1 See, e.g., Lori Preuitt & Kris Sanchez, Suffer These Crimes in Oakland?  Don’t Call the 
Cops, NBC BAY AREA ( July 13, 2010, 12:17 PM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/ 
local/Suffer-These-Crimes-in-Oakland-Dont-Call-the-Cops-98266509.html (providing a 
par-tial list of the forty-four situations to which Oakland police will no longer respond).   
2 Kevin Johnson, Home Burglarized?  Fill Out a Form; Cutbacks Force Police to Curtail 
Calls for Some Crimes, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2010, at 1A. 





6 See NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY:  LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE 
RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 9-17 (2009) (recounting the history of the “order-
maintenance revolution”). 
7 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows:  The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 29-38. 
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Americans had already concluded that the “comedy of the commons”8 
was not funny anymore.  A dramatic decline in decorum in urban pub-
lic spaces—combined with an equally dramatic economic disinvest-
ment in American cities—led to disillusionment with the laissez-faire 
approach to public space management that had dominated urban pol-
icy since the 1960s.9  Moreover, a colorable case can be made that the 
renewed attention to the quality of life in urban public spaces helped 
spur the unexpected urban resurgence of the past few decades.10  
At least since the publication of Garrett Hardin’s 1968 article The 
Tragedy of the Commons,11 most policymakers and social scientists have 
assumed that resources held in common—including the urban com-
mons of sidewalks, streets, and parks—are doomed to exploitation.12  
These same social scientists and policymakers also have become sharply 
divided over how to prevent the commons from descending into trag-
edy.  Some join Hardin in asserting that centralized, governmental con-
trol of the commons is necessary.13  Others argue that privatization is 
the simplest and most effective way to avoid the tragedy of the com-
 
8 Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:  Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986).  The “comedy of the commons” postulates 
that defining certain property as “public” could create “infinite ‘returns to scale’” and 
create wealth for all.  Id. 
9 See GEORGE KELLING & CATHERINE COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:  RESTORING 
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 70-108 (1996) (discussing the col-
lapse of laissez-faire policing strategies); Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Miscon-
duct in City Spaces:  Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 
1209-17 (1996) (discussing the causes and effects of deregulation of urban public spaces). 
10 See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the Con-
sumer City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275, 1286-93 (2006) (arguing that urban resurgence is  
attributable in part to increasing demand for the consumer amenities and opportunity 
for social interactions that cities provide). 
11 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
12 See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 57, 60 (2011) (“The quality of a neighborhood commons—of its street life, 
sidewalks, open spaces, and public parks—might begin to decline through increasing 
demands by different users and uses of the space.”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to 
Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 364 (2010) (noting that cities do not typically leave 
dumpsters near urban parks or sidewalks because it will invite people to abuse the 
dumpsters and dispose of their negative-value assets in them).  
13 This view pervades the literature on environmental regulation.  See, e.g., WILLIAM 
OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 148-52 (1977) (linking commons 
theory in the environmental context to the work of Thomas Hobbes); George C. Cog-
gins, Regulating Federal Natural Resources:  A Summary Case against Devolved Collaboration, 
25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 602, 604 (1999) (reaffirming the need for a strong governmental role 
in natural resource management). 
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mons because (to borrow from Henry Smith) exclusion is a more  
effective means of resource management than governance.14  But in  
recent years, economists and property theorists, led most prominently 
by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom, have challenged the axiomatic prop-
osition that the commons inevitably descends into tragedy or that “un-
owned” property is doomed to overuse.15  While Ostrom’s work suggests 
that cooperative management of common-pool resources is not only 
possible but also can arise organically, other scholars have emphasized 
the undertheorized and underappreciated benefits of shared owner-
ship.  For example, Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller’s 2001 article, 
The Liberal Commons, demonstrated that joint ownership arrangements, 
with elements of both private and commons property, can have signifi-
cant benefits over individual ownership.16  
Over the past several decades, discussions about the appropriate 
tools of commons management have played out in a particularly illu-
minating way in policy debates about the management of urban public 
spaces.  Urban public spaces are not a pure commons per se, as they 
have owners (i.e., local governments).  However, political and consti-
tutional limitations placed on those owners dramatically curtail the 
extent to which they control those spaces, resulting in streets, parks, 
and sidewalks very strongly resembling commons.  These public-space 
management discussions tend to map themselves neatly onto theoreti-
cal debates about commons resource management.  Some commenta-
tors urge, à la Hardin,17 that government coercion is needed to restore 
 
14 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:  Two Strategies for Delineating Prop-
erty Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S467 (2002) (arguing that governance and exclu-
sion are the two extremes of a spectrum of rules with different types of property rights 
falling between them). 
15 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITU-
TIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 14 (1990) (arguing that individuals in a commons are 
not “inevitably caught in a trap from which they cannot escape” and insisting that the 
ability to avoid a tragedy of the commons “varies from situation to situation”) (empha-
sis omitted); see also John Tierney, The Non-Tragedy of the Commons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 
2009, 12:41 PM), http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/the-non-tragedy-of-
the-commons (arguing both that “too often . . . commons ended up in worse shape 
once they were put under the control of distant bureaucrats,” and, based on Ostrom’s 
research, that a lack of government interference can actually preserve resources). 
16 See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 
581-87 (2001) (maintaining that the cooperation, room for autonomy, and right to exit 
inherent in an “ideal” liberal commons produce less overuse, underinvestment, and 
waste than individual ownership). 
17 See Hardin, supra note 11, at 1247 (extolling the virtues of coercion). 
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order to the urban commons:  Broken Windows is of this ilk, as are por-
tions of Robert Ellickson’s work on public-space zoning.18  Others urge 
the privatization of urban public spaces to transform them into some-
thing akin to Dagan and Heller’s “liberal commons.”19  
On the ground in American cities, these theoretical arguments 
have been translated into concrete policies, including policing strate-
gies (for example, order-maintenance and community policing) and 
urban development strategies (for example, business improvement dis-
tricts (BIDs)).  The former clearly instantiates the view that successful 
commons management depends on government coercion, and the 
latter represents a conviction that the quasi privatization of the com-
mons is advisable.  While, legally, the management of urban common 
spaces remains the purview of the police, quasi-privatization mecha-
nisms such as BIDs also perform public-space management functions, 
especially the funding of infrastructure improvements and supple-
mental public services.  The much celebrated (and debated) urban re-
bound of the past two decades suggests that this compromise has been 
partially successful, insofar as success is measured by a resurgent urban 
population base and the renewal of central-city neighborhoods.20  
 
18 See Robert C. Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1220-22 (proposing a hypothetical system 
of red, yellow, and green zoning—with each zone governed by a different degree of 
government intervention—in order to ban or allow activities, such as panhandling and 
bench squatting). 
19 Dagan & Heller, supra note 16; see also Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old 
Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 87-88 (1998) (urging the creation of “Neighborhood 
Improvement Districts” as a “mandatory-membership organization of property owners” 
empowered to decide distribution of public goods within the neighborhood); Robert 
H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood:  A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective 
Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 833 (1999) (arguing 
that state governments should pass legislation to “allow self-governance [by neighborhood 
associations] in these neighborhoods, through new collective private ownerships”). 
20 See, e.g., Patrick A. Simmons & Robert E. Lang, The Urban Turnaround (analyzing 
the urban population increase in thirty-six U.S. cities throughout the 1990s), in 1 RE-
DEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA  51, 51 (Bruce Katz & Robert E. Lang eds., 
2003); Rebecca R. Sohmer & Robert E. Lang, Downtown Rebound (contending that, 
while most central cities are “losing population to their surrounding metropolitan  
area, . . . most downtowns within those central cities are gaining a larger share of metro-
politan statistical area population”), in 1 REDEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA:  
EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000, supra, at 63, 63; see also Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 10, 
at 1288-93 (arguing that the urban resurgence since the 1980s was caused by falling 
crime rates, rising income, and a higher demand for amenities like museums and res-
taurants).  But cf. Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Econom-
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This is an opportune time to reexamine the commons-management 
questions raised by these policies.  As this Article’s opening anecdote 
suggests, the current economic crisis is forcing cities to scale back law 
enforcement efforts, and it is limiting the financing available to fund 
sublocal investments in urban public spaces.  It is possible that these 
pressures will lead the current urban-commons compromise to unravel, 
resulting in less public regulation of urban public spaces, more pres-
sure for private regulation, or both.  Using these tensions as a starting 
point, this Article will draw upon the literature on commons-space 
management from multiple disciplines—especially law, economics, 
and sociology—to reflect critically upon the optimal regulation of ur-
ban public spaces and the possibility of cooperative commons man-
agement arising in the absence of government regulation.  
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I briefly outlines the 
commons debate.  It focuses particularly on arguments that either  
coercive regulation or privatization is necessary for efficient commons 
management and on Ostrom’s work suggesting that cooperative  
management regimes may arise organically.  Part I also argues that the 
lessons from the literature can be fruitfully applied to the question of 
urban public-space management.  Part II describes the evolution of 
the regulation of the urban commons, with an emphasis on the  
connections between these theoretical arguments and urban policy 
innovations in recent decades.  Drawing upon legal and social science 
literatures, Part III analyzes whether greater privatization or coopera-
tive management of urban public spaces is advisable or possible.  The 
Article concludes by asking whether the lessons of urban space man-
agement can be exported to questions of commons management in 
other contexts. 
I.  THE URBAN COMMONS “PROBLEM” 
In his influential 1968 article, The Tragedy of the Commons, Garrett 
Hardin argued that coercive government regulation is necessary to 
prevent the degradation of common-pool resources, because individual 
resource appropriators receive the full benefit of their use and bear 
 
ic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 323-31 (2010) (challenging the assumption that 
redevelopment efforts are causally linked to the urban resurgence). 
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only a share of their cost.21  Analogizing to game theory, the tragedy of 
the commons is a prisoner’s dilemma.22  Since no individual has the 
right to control or exclude others, each appropriator has a very high 
discount rate and little incentive to efficiently manage the resource in 
order to guarantee future use.  In Hardin’s words, 
[T]herein is the tragedy.  Each man is locked into a system that compels 
him to increase his [use] without limit—in a world that is limited.  Ruin is 
the destination toward which all men rush, each pursing his own best in-
terest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.
23
  
Hardin’s conclusion that coercive, centralized government regulation 
represents the only way to avoid tragic overuse of commons resources 
is embedded in many concrete public policies, including environmen-
tal regulations and many of the order-maintenance policies reviewed 
below.24  
In contrast, the conventional wisdom among many economists and 
legal scholars holds that privatization, not regulation, is the most effec-
tive solution to the problem of the commons.  The stylized and elegant 
version of the argument, set forth in the work of Harold Demsetz, sug-
gests that privatization internalizes the costs of resource appropriation, 
thereby creating incentives to use resources more efficiently.25  Subse-
quent commentators have refined Demsetz’s account.  Robert Ellick-
son emphasizes the benefits of privatization for resource uses with 
small and medium geographic effects, but questions whether regula-
tion may be necessary to police larger-scale effects.26  Henry Smith 
highlights the benefits of the exclusion right (a central tenet of private 
property ownership) over other governance-based methods of resource 
 
21 Hardin, supra note 11, at 1244.  This was not an original insight.  See, e.g.,  
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 2, ch. 1, § 10 ( Jeffrey Henderson ed., H. Rackham trans., Har-
vard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1944) (“Property that is common to the greatest number of 
owners receives the least attention . . . .”); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a 
Common-Property Resource:  The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 135 (1954) (“Wealth that is 
free for all is valued by none because he who is foolhardy enough to wait for its proper 
time of use will only find that it has been taken by another.”). 
22 See OSTROM, supra note 15, at 3-5. 
23 Hardin, supra note 11, at 1244. 
24 See OSTROM, supra note 15, at 12-13 (reviewing literature regarding privatization 
as a policy alternative to avoid the tragedy of the commons). 
25 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 
(1967) (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of inter-
nalization become larger than cost of internalization.”). 
26 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327-35 (1993). 
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management; exclusion, he argues, is a low-cost way of preventing  
resource dissipation—at least when the costs of parcelization and risks 
of incursion are relatively low.27  
A.  Cooperative Commons Management:   
Preconditions and Benefits 
The classic regulation–privatization dichotomy has been refined 
and challenged numerous times, including, most influentially, by Elinor 
Ostrom, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009.28  In 
her classic book, Governing the Commons, Ostrom documents several 
examples of longstanding common-pool resource regimes that have 
succeeded with neither privatization nor pervasive centralized regula-
tion.29  Ostrom argues that effective appropriation strategies can arise, 
even among heterogeneous appropriators, under certain conditions, 
including shared norms of appropriation, delineation of the universe 
of permitted appropriators, congruence between the appropriation 
rules and local conditions, effective monitoring by accountable indi-
viduals, and clearly defined boundaries.30  Ostrom calls into question 
the efficacy of external attempts to regulate resources characterized by 
these conditions.  Indeed, she argues that some of the institutional fail-
ures that she has studied result from ill advised central regulation that 
displaces or disregards preexisting cooperative regulatory regimes.31  
Ostrom’s optimism is not unbounded.  She does not suggest that 
all communities will achieve optimal commons regulation without 
government intervention.  On the contrary, the successful commons-
 
27 See Smith, supra note 14, at S475-77 (arguing that because exclusion “prevents 
the ‘rest of the world’ from undertaking many uses,” it represents a more cost-efficient 
alternative to having to “contract with every possible invader”). 
28 Louis Uchitelle, 2 U.S. Social Scientists Share Nobel in Economics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2009, at B1. 
29 In some cases, these regimes have existed for over half a millennium.  See OSTROM, 
supra note 15, at 62-65 (discussing the formal establishment of an association to achieve 
regulation over the use of common resources in Törbel, Switzerland, in Feburary 
1483); id. at 69-82 (discussing the Spanish huerta irrigation systems, which date back to 
at least the mid-fifteenth century). 
30 Id. at 90-101. 
31 In one example, residents of a Sri Lankan fishing village had agreed upon an 
elaborate set of appropriation rules regulating when particular residents’ nets would be 
used to catch fish.  When later legislation codified “criteria for allocating access to the 
water,” it led to a breakdown of the formerly-agreed-upon rules and, arguably, an un-
fair distribution of the returns from fishing.  Id. at 149-57. 
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management regimes that she describes all depend on government 
enforcement to some extent.  Some of them are effectively governmental:  
that is, they exercise authority akin to limited-purpose local govern-
ments.32  At least some of her examples, like the special water districts 
of Southern California, actually are special purpose local gov-
ernments.  It follows that Ostrom’s characterization of these districts as 
cooperative is somewhat odd, given that they developed as a result of 
litigation spanning more than a decade.33  
Moreover, as Dagan and Heller observe, Ostrom’s success stories 
all depend upon limitations on rights of alienation, in order to pre-
serve continuity among the pool of appropriators.34  Dagan and Heller 
criticize Ostrom and her allies for failing to “consider that the price of 
their commons successes—which require locking people together in 
static communities—may be too dear, particularly for those who place 
a high value on individual liberty.”35  They build a case for property 
regimes that not only preserve the right of exit, but also capture the 
benefits of shared resources through internal governance mecha-
nisms.  This “liberal commons”36 (or “governance property”)37 is, in 
Carol Rose’s words, “commons on the inside, property on the out-
side.”38  That is, the resource in question is not a pure commons, open 
to all, but rather is owned by a finite number of people who manage 
and exclude outsiders from its use.  Dagan and Heller argue that such 
regimes—which, under their taxonomy, include marital property, con-
dominiums, partnerships, and close corporations—are “ideal” modes of 
 
32 Id. at 58-88 (discussing forestry and irrigation regimes).  On special purpose  
local governments, see RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW 269-77 (7th ed. 2009).  See also Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 367-70 
(1981) (upholding the constitutionality of a property-based voting scheme that gov-
erned a local entity in charge of delivering untreated water and selling electricity to 
hundreds of thousands of people in Arizona); OSTROM, supra note 15, at 129-36 (dis-
cussing the process for forming groundwater districts). 
33 See OSTROM, supra note 15, at 111-26 (discussing the groundwater litigation in 
Southern California). 
34 Dagan & Heller, supra note16, at 566. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 553. 
37 In this Symposium, Gregory Alexander refers to these forms of ownership as 
“governance property.”  See generally Gregory Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. #### (2012). 
38 Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property:  Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998). 
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organization that “enable[] a limited group of owners to capture the 
economic and social benefits from cooperative use of a scarce resource, 
while also ensuring autonomy to individual members who retain a  
secure right to exit.”39  
B.  Urban Public Space as a Commons 
Dagan and Heller’s work also illuminates a central problem in dis-
cussions of commons regulation—namely, the lumping together of 
unowned resources (true commons) with those that are owned by lim-
ited groups of people who exercise rights of both governance and ex-
clusion (their “liberal commons” examples, as well as, arguably, the 
common pool resources Ostrom studied).  Obviously, effective man-
agement of a true open-access resource is far more difficult than  
management of a “liberal commons,” as no individual or group of  
individuals has the right to exclude others from using a resource.    
Additionally, the fact that many resources commonly considered to be 
held “in common” (e.g., national parks and forests) are actually state-
owned40 further complicates the taxonomic difficulties plaguing  
discussions of commons management tools.41  
Before beginning a discussion of urban public spaces as a  
commons problem, it is necessary to make the case that urban public 
spaces are commons.  In the technical legal sense, they arguably are 
not.  Local governments own most city streets, sidewalks, and parks, 
either outright or as public easements that encumber the fee simple 
titles of abutting property owners. These local governments manage 
these assets and assert their ownership rights in various ways.  For ex-
ample, parks are frequently off-limits after dark; protestors, paraders, 
and street vendors must secure permits; traffic regulations are ubiqui-
tous; and entire streets may be closed for any number of reasons (for 
example, routine repairs, enabling neighborhood festivals, assuring 
the safety of paraders or runners, or promoting urban development).42  
 
39 Dagan & Heller, supra note 16, at 553. 
40 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 40 (1988) (defining state-
owned resources as “collective property”). 
41 The public trust doctrine even further complicates the reality of a pure commons 
concept.  See generally, e.g., Michael Seth Benn, Comment, Towards Environmental Entre-
preneurship:  Restoring the Public Trust Doctrine in New York, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 203 (2006). 
42 For example, in the summer of 2011, New York City closed thirteen underused 
street segments in areas such as the South Bronx for several hours a day to create “play 
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That said, the scope of a local government’s “ownership” rights 
over the urban commons is far less extensive than, say, the federal 
government’s rights over the national parks, forests, and military bases.  
A long string of Supreme Court decisions upholding the constitution-
ality of public space regulation has dramatically curtailed local gov-
ernments’ control over appropriators of urban public space.43  While 
the precedential weight of many of these Warren Court–era decisions 
has been limited by subsequent rulings,44 these cases continue to dra-
matically limit local governments’ rights of exclusion and governance.45  
The First Amendment protects expressive activity in public spaces,  
although a local government may impose content-neutral, reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions on it.46  The vagueness doctrine 
dramatically curtails the degree of discretion a city can vest in police 
officers to regulate public spaces.47  And other constitutional doc-
 
streets,” which “created an atmosphere like a block party, except the play streets were 
devoted to exercising . . . .”  Blair Kamin, How to Correct Chicago’s Open Space Shortage:  10 
Ideas That Could Help City’s Park-Poor Neighborhoods Away from the Lakefront, CHI. TRIB. 
(Oct. 14, 2011, 10:30:06 PM), http://featuresblogs.chicagotribune.com/theskyline/2011/ 
0/how-to-correct-chicagos-open-space-shortage-10-ideas-that-could-help-citys-park-poor-
neighborhoods-a.html. 
43 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165, 171 (1972) (inval-
idating a city vagrancy ordinance on due process–related grounds and suggesting that 
the Constitution protects the right to “loaf”); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-35 
(1968) (upholding a prohibition of public drunkenness, but questioning whether such 
laws might be invalid criminalizations of “a mere status”). 
44 See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Twenty-Seventh Annual Review of Criminal 
Procedure—Foreword:  The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1167 
(1998) (showing that many Warren Court–era standards now frustrate the policies de-
signed to fix social problems that had been identified by the Warren Court); Stephen 
F. Smith, Taking Lessons from the Left?:  Judicial Activism on the Right, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 57, 62 (2002) (noting the Rehnquist Court’s retrenchment from the Warren 
Court’s constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence). 
45 In contrast to the criminal sphere, the scope of a local government’s authority 
over economic regulations—including regulations of public spaces such as limits on 
street vending—is broad because such government decisions are subject to rational basis 
review.  See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 107-09 (1949) (giv-
ing great deference to local legislators in regards to laws governing public advertising). 
46 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1127 (3d ed. 2006) (summariz-
ing permissible restrictions on speech in public fora). 
47 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (citing “too much discre-
tion to the police” and “too little notice to citizens who wish to use the public streets” as 
reasons for striking down an antigang ordinance for vagueness). 
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trines—including the right to travel,48 freedom of association,49 and the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment50—limit local governments’ abilities to exclude individuals, in-
cluding excessive or irresponsible appropriators, from the urban 
commons.  This reality was highlighted in 2002, when the Sixth Circuit 
invalidated a Cincinnati ordinance banning persons previously arrested 
for drug offenses from the “public streets, sidewalks, and other public 
ways” of any designated “drug-exclusion zone[].”51  The City of Cin-
cinnati argued that the ordinance was necessary to restore order in 
neighborhoods plagued by drugs.52  The court, however, ruled that the 
ordinance violated the excluded individuals’ First Amendment rights 
of association.53  Other lower courts have invalidated ordinances im-
posing juvenile curfews,54 penalizing aggressive panhandling,55 and 
prohibiting sleeping in public places,56 on a variety of constitutional 
grounds.  And, as Carol Rose has argued, our legal tradition has long 
treated certain kinds of public spaces, including roads, as “inherently 
public.”57  
 
48 See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944-49 (9th Cir. 1997) (invali-
dating a juvenile curfew on right-to-travel grounds). 
49 See, e.g., Cradle of Liberty Council, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 08-2429, 2012 
WL 947008, at *9-15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2012) (affirming a jury finding that a resolution 
that attempted to evict the Boy Scouts from a city-owned building for violating a munic-
ipal nondiscrimination law violated the group’s right to expressive association). 
50 See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that a law criminalizing sitting, lying, or sleeping on public streets or sidewalks vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment), vacated, 
505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
51 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).   
52 Id. at 502. 
53 Id. at 505-06. 
54 E.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 940-44 (9th Cir. 1997). 
55 See Loper v. NYPD, 999 F.2d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 1993) (invalidating an anti-
panhandling statute on freedom of speech grounds); Berkeley Cmty. Health Project v. 
City of Berkeley, 902 F. Supp. 1084, 1094-95 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (same), vacated in part, 
966 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (approving a stipulated settlement repealing the 
offending ordinance). 
56 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1992)  
(enjoining Miami’s “pattern and practice of arresting homeless people for the purpose 
of driving them from public areas” on Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, due 
process, and right-to-travel grounds). 
57 See Rose, supra note 8, at 770-71 (connecting the public nature of roads to  
national economic development). 
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In other words, although urban public spaces are not unowned, 
they are effectively open-access and are thus much closer to a pure 
commons than either Ostrom’s common-pool resource regimes or 
Dagan and Heller’s “liberal commons.”  As Ellickson has observed, the 
open-access nature of urban public spaces makes them “classic sites for 
tragedy.”58  And many of our cities’ public spaces indeed descended 
into tragedy in the middle decades of the twentieth century, when out-
of-control crime rates and pervasive disorder became expected, and 
many Americans simply chose to avoid the urban commons whenever 
possible.59  
II.  URBAN PUBLIC-SPACE MANAGEMENT:   
A SHORT EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY 
Nothing about the condition of urban public spaces in the early 
1980s lent itself to optimism.  Public authorities essentially had aban-
doned the task of managing the urban commons.  Moreover, urban 
public spaces had none of the characteristics that Ostrom suggests 
would make them amenable to cooperative regulation:  they were not 
“property on the outside, commons on the inside.”60  They had neither 
clearly defined boundaries nor a stable, limited pool of appropriators.  
Frequent appropriators had no legal right to exclude outsiders or to 
sanction those who violated accepted norms of appropriation.  Since 
anyone could appropriate the commons at any time, without restriction, 
classical economic theory would have predicted a rush to the resource, 
with each appropriator seeking to maximize the benefit of the appro-
priation before the depletion of the resource by others.  Theoretically, 
the lack of a right to exclude dramatically increases the likelihood that 
the commons would become tragic.61  Yet, to the surprise of many,  
order has been restored to the urban commons over the last few  
decades—thanks in large part to the confluence of two distinct policy 
 
58 Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1168 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59 See, e.g., PAUL S. GROGAN & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIES:  A BLUEPRINT FOR 
URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD REVIVAL 152 (2000) (“Out-of-control crime was the nearly uni-
versal expectation for the inner city.  Any other positive trend there . . . was sharply 
hemmed in by the prospect of continued crime and, just as important, an all-but-
unshakable fear of crime.”). 
60 Rose, supra note 38, at 155. 
61 See OSTROM, supra note 15, at 34-35 (summarizing the nature of collective-action 
problems). 
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developments that represent opposite poles in the debate over what 
constitute appropriate tools for commons-space management. 
A.  The Re-Regulation of the Urban Commons 
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the governance of 
urban public spaces—in commons-regulation terms, the control of 
public-space appropriators—was the primary focus for municipal  
police forces.  Laws criminalizing vagrancy, loitering, and public drunk-
enness gave police officers vast discretion in deciding whether to arrest 
individuals for breaches of the peace.62  While most order-maintenance 
efforts were undoubtedly informal,63 the availability of legal sanctions 
for breaches of the public order provided an important back up to 
informal order-maintenance efforts.64  Indeed, prior to the “constitu-
tional revolution” of the late 1960s, a large number of arrests were for 
public-order offenses.65  Unfortunately, the old commons-regulation 
regime frequently targeted minorities and the poor, resulting in un-
even and discriminatory enforcement,66 while the legal system often 
 
62 See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:  
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 595 (1997) (“Many 
citizens were rendered almost perpetually subject to arrest pursuant to catchall vagrancy 
laws.”); William J. Stuntz, Crime Talk and Law Talk, 23 REVS. AM. HIST. 153, 157 (1995) 
(reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
(1993)) (“Prior to the 1960s, vagrancy and loitering laws made it possible for police to 
arrest pretty much anyone . . . .”). 
63 See JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR:  THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW 
AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 31 (1968) (explaining that the patrolman “ap-
proaches incidents that threaten order not in terms of enforcing the law but in terms of 
‘handling the situation’”) (emphasis removed). 
64 See Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-Row:  A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOC. REV. 
699, 702-03 (1967); Wilson & Kelling, supra note 7, at 35 (arguing that society can ben-
efit when police have “the legal tools to remove undesirable persons from a neighbor-
hood when informal efforts to preserve order in the streets have failed”). 
65 See HOWARD M. BAHR, SKID ROW:  AN INTRODUCTION TO DISAFFILIATION 227-28 
(1973) (recounting statistics showing that, during the 1960s, public drunkenness, dis-
orderly conduct, and vagrancy accounted for a substantial percentage of arrests). 
66 See, e.g., David Cole, Twenty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure—Foreword:  
Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered:  A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 
87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1060 (1999) (asserting that the police’s “abuse of the criminal law to 
reinforce racial subordination” influenced the Court’s rulings in the 1950s and 1960s); 
Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1209 (noting that public-order laws “had long been dispro-
portionately enforced against poor people and members of racial minorities”). 
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turned a blind eye to the myriad injustices perpetrated in the name of 
public order.67  
Disillusionment with traditional methods of controlling the con-
duct of public-space appropriators eventually led to the deregulation 
of urban public spaces.  The Warren Court’s “criminal procedure revo-
lution” accelerated this deregulation, but these changes also were in 
keeping with modern policing theory, which held that “on the beat” 
enforcement of public-order crimes served little purpose and spawned 
corruption, unequal enforcement, and public resentment.68  By the 
early 1970s, reforms downplaying officers’ role as public-space regula-
tors had largely eliminated the public-order enforcement regime.69  
The costs of local governments’ decisions to abandon the urban 
commons management role quickly became apparent, as crime rates 
rose despite burgeoning law enforcement budgets, and chaos seemed 
to take hold in many urban public spaces.70  Thus, by the time Broken 
Windows was published in 1982, rising crime rates—and fear of crime 
and urban disorder—had laid the groundwork for new experimenta-
tion with “old-fashioned” order-management strategies.  These order-
restoration strategies have generated two heated academic debates:  
The first of these debates concerns the core claim of the so-called 
“broken windows” hypothesis, which posits that disorder causes 
crime.71  The second concerns the civil-liberties risks implicated by the 
 
67 See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 
604-09 (1956) (recounting judicial abuses during summary proceedings in the Phila-
delphia magistrates’ courts). 
68 See KELLING & COLES supra note 9, at 73-74 (characterizing the reputation of the 
police before progressive reforms took hold as one of “brutality, inefficiency, and cor-
ruption”). 
69 See generally id. at 80-85 (reviewing the history of police reform); Livingston, supra 
note 62, at 565-68 (describing the professionalization—and simultaneous retreat from 
neighborhood policing—of the police, from the late nineteenth century to the 1970s). 
70 See, e.g., KELLING & COLES, supra note 9, at 85-89 (describing the collapse of  
reform-era policing strategies); Livingston, supra note 62, at 568 (describing citizen and 
political frustration with crime rates that began to rise rapidly during the 1960s). 
71 See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE:  CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY 
IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 65-84 (1990) (finding a causal connection between 
disorder and robbery rates, specifically, that “[p]erceived crime problems, fear of 
crime, and actual victimization all [are] limited to social and physical disorder” in a 
given urban area); see also GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., DO POLICE 
MATTER?  AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK CITY’S POLICE REFORMS 6-9 (2001), 
available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_22.pdf (attributing a dramatic 
decline in crime in New York City to an aggressive misdemeanor arrest policy); Hope 
 
Garnett Revised Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2012 7:56 PM 
2010 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1995 
 
vesting of the police with increased authority in managing public 
spaces.72  Order-maintenance policies are both numerous and diverse.  
Some policies, such as former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s 
famous “quality of life” campaign and the anti-gang ordinance at issue 
in City of Chicago v. Morales, directly target perceived “disorders”—gang 
members, squeegeemen, turnstile jumpers, etc.  In other words, these 
policies reflect the assumption that coercive government regulation is 
needed to control the commons.73  Other policies, especially ubiqui-
tous “community policing” efforts, seek to build stronger relationships 
between police officers and the citizens whom they have sworn to pro-
 
Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. & ECON. 235, 256-59 
(2005) (analyzing data from New York City and finding that an aggressive misdemean-
or arrest policy led to a decrease in incidents of violent crime).  But see BERNARD E. 
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER:  THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 
59-78 (2001) (challenging Skogan’s findings—“that neighborhood disorder had a sta-
tistically significant relationship with the level of robbery victimization”—and reinter-
preting the data to show that no support exists for the broken windows hypothesis); 
Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows:  New Evidence from New York City 
and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 287-300 (2006) (casting doubt 
on the accuracy of both the Kelling and Sousa and the Corman and Mocan New York 
City studies); see also Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social 
Observation of Public Spaces:  A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 
603, 637-39 (1999) (finding that disorder was correlated with robbery in a Chicago 
study, but questioning even a weak causal connection between disorder and other serious 
crime).  
72 See generally URGENT TIMES:  POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 
(Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan eds., 1999) (containing essays by authors—
including Margaret Burnham, Alan Dershowitz, Carol Steiker, and Tracey Meares and 
Dan Kahan—engaging in a debate over the proper scope of police empowerment, as 
contrasted with legal safeguards protecting individual rights); Kahan & Meares, supra 
note 44, at 1159-71 (highlighting how the same inner-city minority communities that 
fought aggressive community policing policies in the Civil Rights Era as tools of white 
oppression now support such measures as tools for building safer neighborhoods).  I 
leave both of these debates to the side here, each for slightly different reasons.  As for 
the first, whether order-maintenance strategies effectively control crime is not on point, 
since, the strategies are accepted to be no worse than the laissez-faire approaches they 
recently supplanted.  See HARCOURT, supra note 71, at 59-78 (finding no relationship 
between community “disorder” and crime rates).  As for the second, the risks of abuse 
attendant to coercive government regulation are real, but they also extend far beyond 
the realm of public-space regulation. 
73 See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Police Announce Crackdown on Quality-of-Life Offenses, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994, at 33 (explaining that behind Giuliani’s campaign was “the 
idea that leniency toward these minor infractions . . . raises fears and leads to greater 
crimes”). 
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tect.74  They accomplish this both through policing techniques—for  
example, foot and bike patrols—that ensure more frequent, informal 
interactions and through solicitation of citizen input about policing  
priorities.75  
Community policing practices are closely intertwined with order-
maintenance efforts for at least two reasons.  First, foot and bike pa-
trols maximize officers’ ability to monitor and control disorder and to 
prevent serious crime before it occurs.76  Second, when citizens are 
asked to help shape policing priorities, they frequently prioritize the 
elimination of “prevalent and low-key troubles”77—loitering, vandal-
ism, prostitution, and street gangs:  the public-space “disorder[s]” at 
the heart of the order-maintenance agenda.78  Community-policing 
proponents argue that, by enlisting input from citizens regarding  
police priorities, police can help reinforce appropriate norms of pub-
lic-space allocation and may also catalyze shifts in deviant norms.79  As 
Ostrom emphasizes, shared norms of appropriation are critical to the 
success of commons regulation because they take certain appropria-
tion strategies off the table and limit the likelihood of opportunistic 
behavior.80  In the open-access world of the urban commons, broadly 
shared norms among repeat appropriators are particularly important. 
 
74 See Livingston, supra note 62, at 563-64 (“In community policing, the community, 
rather than police professionalism and the law, becomes a principal source of legitima-
tion for many police efforts directed at ameliorating disorderly conditions.”). 
75 See id. at 575-78 (describing the police tactics used under the community policing 
umbrella). 
76 See MICHAEL J. PALMIOTTO, COMMUNITY POLICING:  A POLICE-CITIZEN PARTNER-
SHIP 99 (2011). 
77 Livingston, supra note 62, at 578 (quoting DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE  
FUTURE 106 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
78 See id. at 573-78 (arguing that citizen input has “become synonymous with a par-
ticular new focus on the quality of life in public places”). 
79 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law:  Strategies for Private Norm  
Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1866-68 (1999) (focusing on the 
utility of deputizing juveniles as private criminal law enforcers in order to “create an 
environment in which juveniles can efficiently signal to each other their own contempt 
for criminality” and therefore effectuate crime reduction); Tracey L. Meares & Kelsi 
Brown Corkran, When 2 or 3 Come Together, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1315, 1360-61 (2007) 
(concluding that police officers’ speaking to a community in approachable terms, such 
as religious language, may facilitate communication and agreement between the commu-
nity and the police). 
80 OSTROM, supra note 15, at 35-57. 
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B.  The Partial Privatization of Public Spaces  
During the period in which order-maintenance policies proliferated, 
local governments also began to address public-space management 
through partial private ordering.  These reforms flow from a very dif-
ferent assumption than the order-maintenance efforts that accompany 
them—namely, the neoclassical economic assumption that the sim-
plest means of managing the commons is privatization, not coercive 
regulation.81  These mechanisms—especially BIDs and, to a lesser ex-
tent, tax increment financing (TIF)82—enable property owners in a 
community to overcome the free-rider problems that plague voluntary 
commons-management efforts.  They do so primarily by vesting prop-
erty owners with special powers of taxation and empowering them to 
spend the revenues raised at the sublocal level.83  
BIDs are a ubiquitous element of the urban landscape.  They also 
are the clearest instantiation of the assumption that private ordering 
should address the management problems plaguing the urban com-
mons.  Although BIDs trace their roots to the special assessment, a 
mechanism for financing public infrastructure that has existed for 
centuries,84 they did not exist in their current form before 1975, with 
 
81 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & 
Proc.) 347 (1967). 
82 I leave TIF to the side for present purposes, as it is fairly debatable whether it, in 
fact, represents a privatization effort in the same way that BIDs do.  TIF earmarks reve-
nue growth within a sublocal territorial area (usually called a TIF district) for reinvest-
ment within the area.  While TIF funds are, like BID funds, frequently used for public-
space management (especially for investment in new public-space infrastructure), 
property owners are not given any additional powers of taxation or formal rights of 
governance as in the BID model.  See Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool:  Tax In-
crement Financing and the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 67-
69 (2010) (explaining the structure of TIF funds and discussing their relation to tax 
laws); Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. 
REV. 503, 512-14 (1997) (describing the operation of TIFs). 
83 Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time:  Business Improvement Districts and  
Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 409-14 (1999). 
84 See Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation:  Special  
Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 204 (1983) (noting that 
the first sustained American appearance of the special assessment occurred at the end 
of the eighteenth century); cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CON-
TROLS 630 (3d ed. 2005) (“Special assessments appeared as early as 1250, when an Eng-
lish statute apportioned by acreage the costs of repairing a seawall around Romney 
Marsh.”). 
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the vast majority of BIDs today being formed between 1990 and 2010.85  
While state and local laws authorizing the creation of BIDs and regu-
lating their details vary significantly, most BIDs share a few core char-
acteristics.  BIDs are, broadly speaking, territorial subdivisions of a city 
in which property owners are empowered to levy, and obligated to pay, 
special assessments to fund supplemental public services.86  BIDs are 
public-private hybrids and are perhaps best analogized to special pur-
pose local governments,87 but their day-to-day operations tend to be 
managed by private, nonprofit corporations.88  Many statutes authoriz-
ing the creation of BIDs also authorize (or even require) cities to con-
tract with these entities to manage BID operations.89  Moreover, as 
Richard Briffault has observed, BIDs almost universally conceive of 
themselves as private entities, rather than as arms of the local govern-
ment.90  BIDs also share some characteristics with the private residential 
community associations that are ubiquitous in the suburban landscape, 
including, notably, the fact that BID governance structures almost uni-
versally privilege property ownership—sometimes to the total exclu-
sion of residents who do not own property within a BID’s boundaries.91  
Unlike residential community associations, however, BIDs do not 
generally exercise formal regulatory authority.92  BIDs’ functions vary 
 
85 See Richard Briffault, The Business Improvement District Comes of Age, 3 DREXEL L. 
REV. 19, 19 (2010) (stating that the first BID in the United States was the Downtown 
Development District of New Orleans—established in 1975—and maintaining that 
“2010 mark[ed] the completion of two decades of . . . the BID movement”). 
86 See Richard Briffault, supra note 83, at 377-87 (providing an overview of the oper-
ation, formation, and legal background of BIDs). 
87 Indeed, courts have relied on this analogy to reject constitutional challenges to 
BID governance structures that favor property owners.  See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Cent. 
Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that because a BID had 
a “limited purpose” its management association was exempt from one-person, one-vote 
requirements and that the “special purpose” government exception to equal suffrage 
did not apply because the district’s activities did not “disproportionately affect narrow 
classes of persons within the district”). 
88 See Briffault, supra note 83, at 409-14 (discussing the governance functions of 
BIDs and explaining that “[b]usinesspeople, especially landowners, generally dominate 
the membership of the BIDs’ managing boards”). 
89 Id. at 409-14.  
90 Id. at 410. 
91 Id. at 412-13 (explaining that boards of BID administrative bodies sometimes  
require “a majority of . . . members to be property owners, businesses [and] persons 
having an interest in property in the district” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
92 See id. at 394-409 (describing the four broad categories of BID activities:  physical 
improvements, traditional municipal services, social services, and business-mentor pro-
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significantly according to both local needs and, importantly, available 
resources.  The larger, better-funded BIDs, such as Philadelphia’s Center 
City and University City Districts, collaborate closely with local gov-
ernment officials and invest significant resources in a wide range of 
quasi-governmental services.  Both of these large BIDs hire their own 
security forces, fund local infrastructure improvements and supple-
mental sanitation services, operate outreach programs for the home-
less, promote local businesses, engage in advisory land-use planning 
efforts, and sponsor special social and cultural events.93  In contrast, 
some BIDs struggle to collect any revenue at all, even though they are 
legally empowered to tax area property owners.94  
As a recent illuminating series of case studies of Philadelphia’s 
BIDs illustrates, public-space management is the top priority of all 
BIDs, large and small, rich and poor.95  Wealthier BIDs seek to accom-
plish this goal in more ambitious and resource-intensive ways.  For ex-
ample, the Center City District employs over one hundred individuals 
who are charged with keeping sidewalks clean and clear of debris, as 
well as a large cadre of Community Service Representatives who, among 
other tasks, use special handheld devices to survey each block in the 
BID boundaries to ensure that problems with public spaces are 
 
grams); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Governing?  Gentrifying?  Seceding?  Real-Time Answers to 
Questions about Business Improvement Districts, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 35, 38-43 (2010) (warning 
that “the closer that BIDs come—in structure and function—to general purpose local 
governments, the more vulnerable they are to equal protection challenges.”).  
93 See Göktuğ Morçöl, Center City District:  A Case of Comprehensive Downtown BIDs, 3 
DREXEL L. REV. 271, 279-81 (2010) (discussing the expansive current functions of the 
Center City District, which include “transportation, land-use planning, streetscape and 
infrastructure improvements, social services for the homeless, and operation of a com-
munity court”); Thomas J. Vicino, New Boundaries of Urban Governance:  An Analysis of 
Philadelphia’s University City Improvement District, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 339, 350-51 (2010) 
(examining the budget for the University City district, as well as the different types of 
activites funded by it, including infrastructure improvements and public safety initia-
tives); CENTER CITY PHILA., http://www.centercityphila.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) 
(listing news events, as well as office, retail, and residential space advertisements); UNIV. 
CITY DIST., http://www.universitycity.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (providing infor-
mation regarding restaurants, activities, accommodations, community service, and oth-
er events and listings).  
94 See Garnett, supra note 92, at 41 (arguing that “[m]any of Philadelphia’s BIDs ap-
pear to be fairly anemic institutions that have difficulty collecting assessments at all”).  
95 See generally Symposium, Business Improvement Districts and the Evolution of Urban 
Governance, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 109-372 (2010).   
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promptly addressed.96  Some of the Community Service Representa-
tives are part of a specially trained Homeless Action Team which seeks 
to “get the homeless off downtown streets and into safe environments 
with any necessary social services.”97  The Center City District, in  
collaboration with the University City District, even runs a court that 
addresses quality-of-life offenses and assigns offenders to community 
service.98  Both have also invested millions of dollars in street lighting, 
beautification, and other public infrastructure improvements.99  While 
BIDs with limited resources find it difficult to accomplish anything at 
all, public-space management efforts of a far more basic and mun-
dane nature remain their top, and often only, priority.  Philadelphia’s 
Germantown Special Services District, for example, has effectively no 
budget—having long since given up on collecting the special assess-
ments owed by local property owners—but does what it can to remove 
trash from neighborhood parks and sidewalks.100  
C.  The Public-Space Management Compromise 
Taken together, order-maintenance policing and BIDs can be  
understood as reflecting a compromise between proponents like Har-
din, who believe coercive government regulation represents the only 
means to prevent overuse of open-access resources, and neoclassical 
economists like Demsetz, who understand privatization as the solution 
to the same problem.  Over the last few decades, police officers have 
reassumed regulation of conduct by public-space appropriators.101  Po-
 
96 Safe:  Community Service Representatives, CENTER CITY PHILA., http://centercityphila.org/ 
about/CSRs.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
97 Id.  As I have previously written, these homeless-relocation efforts represent a 
common, and controversial, public-space-management technique.  See Nicole Stelle 
Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1085-88 (2005) (explaining that much 
of the controversy centers on the perception that these services work to keep the home-
less out of the sight of the other members of the community). 
98 Morçöl, supra note 93, at 281. 
99 Beautiful:  Overview, CENTER CITY PHILA., http://www.centercityphila.org/about/ 
Beautiful.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
100 See Garnett, supra note 92, at 46 (describing an “experiment” performed by the 
Germantown Special Services District, through which it confirmed that the Philadelphia 
Parks Department is slow to respond to complaints about the accumulation of trash in 
Germantown parks). 
101 See KELLING & COLES, supra note 9, at 148-56 (discussing policing tactics em-
ployed in New York City in the 1990s and commenting positively on the reclamation of 
public space brought about by those tactics). 
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lice use a variety of devices to accomplish this task.  Some strategies—
for example, aggressive misdemeanor arrests102—are more Leviathan-
esque than others—for example, community policing.  At the same 
time, new sublocal institutions like BIDs have vested private property 
owners with the power to coercively raise the funds needed to main-
tain public spaces.  BIDs clearly reflect an understanding that property 
owners are better situated than occasional public-space appropriators 
(and even renters) to make decisions about public-space management.  
But BIDs do not go so far as to invest owners with any of the other tra-
ditional tools of management that attend private ownership—or even 
“liberal commons” or “governance property” regimes—such as the 
right to exclude outsiders and establish formal governance rules.  
There is little question that fiscal constraints may force local gov-
ernments to scale back these strategies.  This reality is most clear in the 
policing context, where massive budget cuts and resulting reductions 
in the police force in urban police departments undoubtedly place 
pressure on personnel- and resource-intensive strategies, including 
order-maintenance policing efforts.103  But the fiscal constraints on 
BIDs and other quasi-privatization efforts in cities are real:  because 
BID assessments are frequently keyed to property values, their ability 
to raise revenue through special assessments fluctuates along with the 
real estate market.104  Business owners are also more likely to approve 
additional assessments in better economic times and, as discussed be-
low, are unlikely to do so when property values are depressed.  And 
because BIDs depend on revenue raised through debt and upon state 
and local transfer payments, the looming cloud of state and municipal 
insolvency also limits available resources.105  Anecdotally, the dissolu-
 
102 See KELLING & SOUSA, supra note 71, at 6-10 (analyzing the effects of “broken 
windows policing,” Mayor Giuliani’s aggressive misdemeanor arrest policy); Corman & 
Mocan, supra note 71, at 259-61 (same); Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 71, at 287-300 
(same). 
103 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
104 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 83, at 389-94. 
105 For examples of the challenges facing the state and municipal levels, see Jon 
Hilsenrath & Neil King Jr., Bernanke Rejects Bailouts:  Fed Chief Says State and Local Gov-
ernments Shouldn’t Expect Federal Loans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8-9, 2011, at A2.  See also Tracy 
Gordon, Buy and Hold (On Tight):  The Recent Muni Bond Rollercoaster and What It Means for 
Cities 2-5 (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/ 
papers/2011/0919_muni_bonds_gordon/0919_muni_bonds_gordon.pdf (noting that 
“uncertainty remains” in the municipal bond market after the financial crisis, but that 
“widespread municipal bankruptcies and defaults have not come to pass”); Richard 
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tion of a handful of BIDs throughout the United States reflect these 
realities, but many other BIDs undoubtedly are struggling financially.106  
III.  THE FUTURE OF URBAN COMMONS MANAGEMENT  
If the current financial constraints on local governments prove to 
be short lived, the urban commons compromise may well emerge  
unscathed.  However, given the structural impediments to state and  
municipal fiscal reform—notably, pension obligations and labor  
relations107—the current financial constraints may persist, even if the 
 
Posner, State and Local Government:  The Fiscal Crisis, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Dec. 19, 
2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2010/12/state-and-local-government-
the-fiscal-crisisposner.html (maintaining that the financial crisis “caused a sharp decline 
in state tax revenues, which [were] 12 percent below their pre-downturn levels,” and 
discussing different proposals to ameliorate the situation). 
106 See, e.g., Michael Clark, Atlantic City Special Improvement District Dissolves, PRESS 
ATLANTIC CITY (N.J.), Apr. 18, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 765521 (describing the 
dissolution of a nineteen-year-old BID in Atlantic City and the subsequent transfer of 
assets to the state’s Casino Reinvestment Plan Authority); David Garrick, Escondido:  City 
Eliminates Downtown Merchant Fees, N. COUNTY TIMES (Cal.), Sept. 16, 2011,  
http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/Escondido/article_9333c90a_a8ee_5fff_9a7b_ 
89b1cfd2a6667.html (reporting on the dissolution by the City Council of Escondido of 
a twenty-two-year-old BID due to economic woes).  The financial pressures on TIF dis-
tricts, which rely directly on property taxes and municipal bonds backed by them, are 
even more severe.  See Kay James, Dells Officials Told City’s TIF Districts Short of Repaying 
City for Bonds, PORTAGE DAILY REG. (Wis.), Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.wiscnews.com/ 
portagedailyregister/news/article_42f37c7a-c860-11df-9db2-001cc4c002e0.html?mode= 
story (reporting on a TIF district’s inability to repay its municipal bonds and averaging 
the city’s debt at nearly $20,000 per resident); Joseph Ruzich, Riverside Considers Raising 
Taxes, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 2007, at 4 (noting that the failure of a TIF plan resulted in calls 
to raise taxes on businesses and residents); Elisha Sauers, City Needs to Borrow Another 
$10M, CAPITAL (Md.), May 20, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 10113020 (characterizing the 
$2 million in payments Annapolis owes to its TIF custodian as a “crushing expense”).  
107 See, e.g., Role of Public Employee Pensions in Contributing to State Insolvency and the 
Possibility of a State Bankruptcy Chapter:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial 
& Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 41 (2011) (statement of 
Joshua Rauh, Associate Professor of Finance, Kellogg School of Management, North-
western University) (“Using valuations consistent with financial economics, . . . the 
already-promised part of these unfunded liabilities actually amounts to over $3 tril-
lion.”); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code:  A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 388 (2010) (explaining how those structural impediments can be 
overcome with the help of state intervention); see also PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE 
WIDENING GAP:  THE GREAT RECESSION’S IMPACT ON STATE PENSION AND RETIREE 
HEALTH CARE COSTS 1-2 (2011), available at http://pewcenteronthestates.org/ 
uploadedfiles/Pew_Pensions_retiree_benefits.pdf (estimating that unfunded state  
pension liabilities as of, in most cases, June 2009, were between $1.26 and $2.4 trillion  
depending on the discount rate applied, an increase of 26% over the previous  
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economy fully recovers in relatively short order.  Thus, this is 
 an opportune time to consider whether, where, and how effective 
regulation of the urban commons may arise with limited government 
intervention. 
A.  Increased Privatization 
More extensive privatization represents one possible response to 
the fiscal limitations facing local governments.  Even the complete  
privatization of public spaces is not unprecedented.  Salt Lake City 
transferred title of Temple Square, its city’s central public square, to 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in 1999; the transfer—
and the Church’s subsequent imposition of rules of conduct governing 
visitors to the square—spawned significant controversy.108  Similar, less 
celebrated transfers occur on a relatively routine basis as part of  
“development agreements” between cities and private developers.109  As 
Ellickson has observed, Laredo, Texas, and municipalities in St. Louis 
County, Missouri, routinely privatize street segments to enable home-
owners to set up street associations empowered to levy assessments.110  
 
year); Girard Miller, Benefits, Bankruptcy, and Baloney, GOVERNING (July 8, 2010), 
http://www.governing.com/columns/public-money/state-retiree-Benefits-Bankruptcy-and- 
Baloney.html (“Retirees’ claims would be the most difficult benefits to set aside in a 
municipal bankruptcy . . . .”); Mary W. Walsh, A Path is Sought for States to Escape Debt 
Burdens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at A1 (discussing structural and political constraints, 
including insolvent state pension funds, preventing states and local governments from 
declaring bankruptcy as a way to solve their financial difficulties). 
108 The city initially retained a public easement for the surface that expressly  
empowered the Church to restrict access of anyone “engaging in any illegal, offensive, 
indecent, obscene, vulgar, lewd or disorderly speech, dress or conduct.”  First Unitarian 
Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 2002).  The Tenth 
Circuit invalidated this restriction on First Amendment free-speech grounds, reasoning 
that the reservation of the easement preserved the status of the encumbered property 
as a public forum upon which it could not limit speech.  Id. at 1131-34.  Subsequently, 
the City transferred the easement to the Church; a challenge to that transfer on Estab-
lishment Clause grounds was rejected.  Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 
F.3d 1249, 1258-61 (10th Cir. 2005). 
109 See John C. Crees, Note, The Right and Wrong Ways to Sell a Public Forum, 94 IOWA 
L. REV. 1419, 1435-39 (2009) (providing examples of issues that prevent municipalities 
from privatizing public fora).  In development agreements, a developer and local gov-
ernment agree to a negotiated package of regulatory and development concessions in 
order to streamline a development process.  Alejandro E. Camacho, Mustering the Miss-
ing Voice:  A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive 
Planning in Land Use Decisions (pt. 1), 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 22 (2005). 
110 Ellickson, supra note 19, at 91. 
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And, of course, millions of Americans voluntarily live in planned resi-
dential communities where commons spaces are privately owned and 
governed by residential community associations.  
Economist Robert Nelson has proposed the wide-scale adaptation of 
residential community associations to urban neighborhoods.111  Nelson 
asserts that the benefits and effectiveness of this “liberal commons” 
model greatly surpass those of government regulation:  enabling urban 
communities to secure these advantages could dramatically improve the 
quality of life in urban neighborhoods.112  Nelson’s privatization pro-
posal is quite radical, as it includes a transfer of the right to exclude 
outsiders to property owners.113  As he colorfully observes,  
Many inner city residents would like to exclude criminals, hoodlums, drug 
dealers, truants, and others who often undermine the possibilities for a 
peaceful and vital neighborhood existence. . . .  
 There is no physical or other practical reason why an inner city neigh-
borhood could not become a gated neighborhood. . . .  
 . . . Inner city neighborhoods should have the right to establish land 
use and other controls, including building neighborhood walls, if neces-
sary, to maintain neighborhood quality.114  
Ellickson’s proposal for Block Improvement Districts (BLIDs) is 
more modest.  Ellickson shares Nelson’s concerns that urban resi-
dents—especially the residents of poor, inner-city neighborhoods—are 
systematically disadvantaged by their inability to overcome collective 
action problems and that some steps toward privatization would help 
these residents to organize in order to better address neighborhood 
problems, including the maintenance of urban public spaces.115  Ellick-
son’s proposed BLIDs, however, more closely approximate BIDs for  
residential communities than the residential community associations 
 
111 See ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 301-03 (2005) (proposing that if owners of housing in inner-city 
areas created what he terms “Neighborhood Associations in Established Neighbor-
hoods,” then they “might well experience a large increase in their individual wealth”); 
Nelson, supra note 19, at 866 (suggesting that urban community associations may help 
security). 
112 Nelson, supra note 19, at 866. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 865-67. 
115 See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 92-95, 97-98 (explaining how the proposed BLID 
entities would be structured, the incentives-based logic behind their structure, and 
some suggested functions with which they would be entrusted). 
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and gated communities championed by Nelson.  For example, Ellick-
son argues that BLIDs should concentrate primarily on supplemental 
public services;116 he questions Nelson’s more expansive proposal, in-
stead suggesting that most BLIDs should have only limited regulatory  
authority over private land-use controls.117  
Additional privatization might well improve the efficiency of urban 
public-space governance, result in more orderly public spaces, and 
even increase residents’ quality of life.  It would also, however, raise a 
host of philosophical, practical, and legal difficulties.  Philosophically, 
both residential community associations and BIDs have been the sub-
ject of extensive controversy, with critics asserting, among other things, 
that these institutions are illiberal (because they privilege property 
ownership) and exacerbate existing economic disparities between 
wealthy and poor communities.118  Extending the model as far as Nel-
son suggests would increase those concerns and would raise additional 
ones—especially the implications of formally closing the public-space 
commons.  As Carol Rose has argued, there is a long tradition in  
Anglo-American law of protecting certain public spaces from privatiza-
tion precisely because they are “most valuable when used by indefinite 
and unlimited numbers of persons—by the public at large.”119  
Practically, privatization poses a complex institutional design prob-
lem.120  It would also likely require state-enabling legislation, the enact-
ment of which would involve a host of public choice difficulties.  
Moreover, the current situation in the real estate market, with large 
percentages of American property owners “underwater” on their 
mortgages,121 likely dramatically reduces the attractiveness of privatiza-
tion as a commons governance device.  The depressed real estate mar-
 
116 See id. at 97 (suggesting that a BLID’s articles of incorporation should authorize 
the provision of services on the “life safety,” “sanitation,” and “beautification” fronts). 
117 Id. at 97-100. 
118 Robert B. Reich, Secessssion of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 16. 
119 Rose, supra note 8, at 774. 
120 To begin, consider the difficulty of defining the boundaries of the privatized 
space and the appropriate universe of “owners” of this space. 
121 See, e.g., Mamta Badkar, The 13 States Still Drowning in Underwater Mortgages, BUS. 
INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/12-states-with-mortgages-
underwater-q3-negative-equity-2011-11; Half of Commercial Mortgages to Be Underwater:  
Warren, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/36085517/Half_of_Commercial_ 
Mortgages_to_Be_Underwater_Warren. 
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ket both diminishes the likelihood that owners would agree to financ-
ing new public services voluntarily through special assessments and the 
likelihood that they would have the resources available to pay those 
special assessments if imposed.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there are significant legal 
barriers to privatizing the urban commons.  The Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits, in most cases, the allocation of voting rights by prop-
erty ownership; therefore, a law investing property with the powers of 
exclusion and governance over public spaces would be constitutionally 
suspect.  Indeed, courts rejecting one-person, one-vote challenges to 
BIDs’ governance structures have specifically relied on the fact that 
BIDs do not exercise formal “governmental” authority.122  Although 
privatization via complete transfer of public spaces to private individu-
als presumably would not raise Equal-Protection voting concerns, some 
courts have expressed First Amendment anxieties over the potential 
closure of a public forum.123  
B.  Cooperative Management of the Urban Commons 
Assuming that increased privatization is unlikely, it becomes neces-
sary to explore whether, and under what circumstances, cooperative 
management of the urban commons is possible.  There are many rea-
sons for pessimism about these questions.  After all, a primary catalyst 
for the public-space-management devices described above was dismay 
over the apparent chaos reigning in unregulated public spaces.  
Moreover, the likelihood of cooperative management of the urban 
commons ought to be particularly low.124  Urban public spaces have 
few of the characteristics that Ostrom linked with successful common-
pool resource-management regimes.  Despite these formidable obsta-
cles, many urban communities successfully manage their sidewalks and 
parks with very little government intervention.   
Insight into why—and where—these successes arise can be found 
in multiple academic disciplines.  The legal literature pays a great deal 
 
122 See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(finding that a BID’s responsibility for its core functions was secondary to the city’s and 
thus it did not have sufficient authority to constitute a governmental entity).  
123 See Crees, supra note 109, at 1436-39 (discussing case law in which courts have 
struggled to balance property rights in newly privatized land, and the residual rights of the  
public to free expression, based on easements retained by local governments after sale). 
124 See supra Section I.A. 
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of attention to the role of informal social norms as rules of conduct in 
the regulation of commons.125  Shared norms were among Ostrom’s 
predictors of successful commons management.126  Logically, when 
other predictors are not present, norms become particularly im-
portant.  Any minimally observant person understands that norms play 
a dominant role in managing common spaces.  To borrow from an 
example that I have used elsewhere, I retrieve my recycling bins from 
the end of the driveway, remove my children’s toys from the yard, and 
shovel snow from my sidewalk, not because I am under a legal obliga-
tion to do so (although I undoubtedly am), but because the norms in 
my neighborhood require it.127  These norms are actually quite nuanced:  
tricycles are routinely tolerated on the sidewalk, but larger bicycles and 
wagons are not; on the morning after a heavy snow, it is acceptable to 
shovel only a small path before leaving for work, but it is expected that 
the remaining snow will be cleared promptly at the end of the work-
day; and neighbors allow a one-day grace period for retrieving the re-
cycling bin, after which the gossip begins.  As Ellickson has argued, 
private norms are frequently the superior regulatory mechanism for 
public spaces; legal rules—such as those codified in many order-
maintenance policies or those in Ellickson’s hypothetical public-space 
zoning regime—represent second-best alternatives when informal 
regulatory mechanisms fail.128 
Of course, informal regulatory mechanisms frequently do fail,  
either because antisocial, rather than positive, norms are dominant in 
a community, or because community members find it difficult to or-
ganize and enforce positive social norms (or both).  This threat of regu-
latory failure is why the order-maintenance literature focuses extensively 
on whether government intervention can shift norms.129  It is also why 
 
125 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES 191-208 (1991) (discussing how the practices of high-seas whalers in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries“powerfully illustrate how nonhierarchical 
groups can create welfare-maximizing substantive norms”). 
126 See supra Section I.A. 
127 Nicole Stelle Garnett, Private Norms and Public Spaces, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
183, 185-86 (2009). 
128 See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1243-46 (inquiring into whether “city hall” or “civil 
society” is a better candidate for managing the norms of public spaces). 
129 See Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology:  The New Path of Deterrence, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2479-81 (1997) (supporting policing theories that keep valuable 
and fragile social support networks intact); Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, 
and Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1513, 1527-30, 1535-38 (2002) (contrasting 
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so many order-maintenance policies seek to overcome obstacles to in-
formal community organization in order to catalyze private efforts to 
control our urban public spaces.130  
Norms are a necessary, but not sufficient, input into successful  
collective action.  Successful informal management of the urban 
commons requires both positive social norms of public-space appro-
priation and a high level of social capital, which Robert Putman classi-
cally refers to as “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them.”131  Communities that have access 
to these two important inputs also have the ability to organize infor-
mally to address local problems, including the management of the ur-
ban commons.  In sociological terms, these communities have high 
levels of “collective efficacy.”132  It is hardly a surprise that communities 
with high levels of collective efficacy are safer, more orderly, and more 
socially cohesive than those with low levels of collective efficacy.133  All 
this, in a sense, is a fancy way of stating the obvious.  It is hardly sur-
prising that socially cohesive communities find it easier to get organized 
and address neighborhood problems like management of the urban 
commons.  The difficulty is that, for a host of reasons, many urban 
communities are not socially cohesive.  Moreover, these reasons tend 
 
authoritarian policing, which alienates the citizenry, with “New Community Policing,” 
which builds consensus and support for law and order); Tracey L. Meares, Praying for 
Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1612-19 (2002) (retelling how police officers 
and religious leaders worked to hold prayer vigils and providing a model for public-
private alliances); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the 
Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 812 (1998) (“Law enforcement policies should 
have as a goal the promotion of social organization . . . .”). 
130 However, even the latter actually may rely upon coercive government enforce-
ment of positive social norms.  See Garnett, supra note 127, at 193-98 (suggesting that 
community policing efforts depend upon norm enforcement rather than norm entre-
preneurship). 
131 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE:  THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF THE 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000).  Social capital is the subject of a voluminous and 
somewhat contentious literature, and Putnam’s formulation is itself contested by other 
social scientists.  See, e.g., DAVID HALPERN, SOCIAL CAPITAL 1-40 (2005) (reviewing litera-
ture on the topic).  Putnam’s “lean and mean” formulation, however, suffices here. 
132 See Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime:  A Multilevel Study of 
Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 918 (1997) (defining collective efficacy as “social 
cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of 
the common good”). 
133 See id. at 923 (finding a correlation among collective efficacy, intensity of local 
social ties, and social organizations, level of neighborhood services, and low violent 
crime rates). 
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to have feedback effects on one another:  disorder in public spaces 
increases residents’ fear of victimization, residents who fear victimiza-
tion are less likely to leave their homes to enter the public square and 
interact with their neighbors, and residents who do not know their 
neighbors are unlikely to trust and collaborate with them in order to 
address neighborhood problems.134  
The trick is to identify the conditions that interrupt this cycle  
of dysfunction, then enable neighbors to coordinate their norm-
enforcement efforts among themselves.  Here, the insights of urban 
sociologists prove particularly useful.  Sociologists point to a number 
of factors that predict relatively high levels of collective efficacy, even 
in the face of demographic factors that tend to suppress it.  To begin, 
collective efficacy increases as average residential tenure and levels of 
homeownership increase.135  For all of the reasons discussed above, 
homeowners have significant financial incentives to address neighbor-
hood problems.  It seems reasonable to assume that residential stability 
probably increases the likelihood that neighbors will get to know, and 
grow to trust, one another.136  Longer-term residents have incentives to 
address issues of public-space management, as well, since the problems 
attendant to mismanagement affect their daily quality of life.  Thus, 
long-term residents (and especially homeowners) are more likely than 
short-term residents to behave responsibly like “owners” of urban  
public spaces. 
In addition to residential tenure, other neighborhood structural 
factors may influence levels of collective efficacy and, therefore, the 
possibility of an effectively managed urban commons.  Land use pat-
terns also apparently influence the likelihood of cooperative commons 
management.  Contrary to the now-popular view of Jane Jacobs (who 
extolled the virtues of mixed private land use),137 there is evidence that 
mixed-land-use neighborhoods have lower levels of collective efficacy 
 
134 See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 129-40 (discussing the effects of the “fear of crime” 
phenomenon as well as ways in which order-maintenance policies have attempted to 
alleviate it). 
135 See Sampson et al., supra note 132, at 921. 
136 Homeownership similarly increases the length of residential tenure since the 
transaction costs of moving are significantly higher for owners than for renters. 
137 See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 46 (1961) 
(“Stores, bars, and restaurants, as the chief examples, work in several different and 
complex ways to abet sidewalk safety.”). 
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than do exclusively residential neighborhoods.138  Compared to inhab-
itants of exclusively residential blocks, those on blocks with commer-
cial land uses report that they know their neighbors less well and are 
less likely to trust them to intervene in a neighborhood problem; they 
also feel that they themselves have less control over neighborhood 
events.139  The reasons are not entirely clear, but it may be that the foot 
traffic generated by commercial land uses impedes residents’ ability to 
determine who “belong[s]” in their community.140  Commercial land 
use also increases the likelihood that strangers, including deviant ones, 
will cross porous neighborhood boundaries.141  While longer residential 
tenure is an important predictor of collective efficacy, even short-term 
residents have a higher stake in maintaining the public space in their 
community than do strangers, who are unlikely to share local norms of 
conduct and are more likely to behave irresponsibly, as they have no 
longer-term interest in neighborhood health. 
At a more micro level, the architectural literature on “defensible 
space” suggests that building design can increase positive feelings of 
territoriality and encourage residents to assert ownership over public 
spaces.  The catalyst for this literature was Oscar Newman’s classic 
study of the design of public housing projects.  Newman argued that, 
by enabling informal monitoring of public spaces, certain architectural 
features of housing projects could reduce crime rates.142  Subsequently, 
many urban planners and architects—including, most recently, the 
self-styled “new urbanists”—have urged greater integration of these 
 
138 See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 64-67 (discussing literature that calls Jacobs’s  
assertions into question). 
139 See, e.g., Stephanie W. Greenberg et al., Safety in Urban Neighborhoods:  A Comparison 
of Physical Characteristics and Informal Territorial Control in High and Low Crime Neighbor-
hoods, 5 POPULATION & ENV’T 141, 149-54 (1982) (correlating commercial land use and 
crime rates); Ralph B. Taylor et al., Street Blocks with More Nonresidential Land Use Have 
More Physical Deterioration:  Evidence from Baltimore and Philadelphia, 31 URB. AFF. REV. 120, 
121-22 (1995) (explaining that nonresidential uses remove residents that could have 
helped manage the block and introduces strangers to the area). 
140 RALPH B. TAYLOR, HUMAN TERRITORIAL FUNCTIONING 185 (1988); see also id. 
(arguing that commercial land use arrangements “can create ‘holes’ in the fabric of 
resident-based territorial control” and “gaps in the residents’ territorial control”). 
141 See, e.g., Greenberg et al., supra note 139, at 161 (attributing lower crime rates in 
certain neighborhoods to their lower “flow of outsiders”). 
142 See OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE:  CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN 
DESIGN 5-11 (1972) (illustrating architectural features that enable surveillance by near-
by residents of semipublic spaces). 
Garnett Revised Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2012 7:56 PM 
2026 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1995 
 
features into both public and private redevelopments, as well as land 
use regulations.143  
The policy implications of these two land-use factors are unclear.  
As I have discussed in detail in previous work, there are high costs  
associated with excluding commercial land uses from urban neigh-
borhoods, including a reduction in the vitality of city life that is attrac-
tive to some would-be residents.144  The costs of mandating certain 
architectural requirements through land use regulations also are quite 
high, and include a risk that increased building costs will dampen in-
vestment in urban developments.145  As a predictive matter, however, 
an understanding of the features correlated with a likelihood of suc-
cessful commons management is a valuable planning tool for city offi-
cials in a world of limited resources.  
CONCLUSION:  TOWARD A CROSS-COMMONS PERSPECTIVE 
Like the fisheries and water systems that were the focus of 
Ostrom’s classic work, the urban commons is a precious resource for 
city dwellers.  It is also, like all open-access resources, vulnerable to 
exploitation.  That exploitation, however, is not inevitable.  This Article 
has sought to illustrate that the urban commons need not descend 
into tragedy—even at times when resources for coercive government 
regulation are in short supply.  As Ostrom’s account teaches, however, 
not all common pool resources can be managed cooperatively.  Thus, 
this Article might be seen as an extension of her efforts to identify the 
preconditions for successful commons management.  In fact, experi-
ence with the urban public commons suggests that Ostrom’s account 
may be overly pessimistic—that, at least with respect to open-access 
resources with fixed locations (e.g., streets and sidewalks), cooperative 
management without excessive propertization is possible.   
An important next step, beyond the scope of the current inquiry, 
would be an analysis of these preconditions that extends beyond the 
urban commons.  For example, it would be useful to consider whether 
 
143 See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 
(2002) (applying Newman’s theory that architecture, urban design, and legal or emo-
tional ownership of real estate can decrease crime rates). 
144 See GARNETT, supra note 6, at 90-100 (arguing that urban areas should use zon-
ing to highlight the benefit of living in an urban environment). 
145 See id. at 180-88 (using Milwaukee and Chicago as examples evidencing the rela-
tionship between regulators and developers). 
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the preconditions and policies for successful management of the  
urban commons also predict the successes and failures of commons 
that are not fixed, physical spaces.  In the context of intellectual prop-
erty and the digital commons, for example, scholars have engaged in 
extensive debate over issues similar to those raised in this Article.  
Some scholars champion the possibility of cooperative commons man-
agement146 and question whether creative content has become “over-
propertized.”147  Others claim that strong intellectual property rights 
are necessary to guarantee innovation.148  Still others call for additional 
regulation of digital content on the Internet.149  Although a full discus-
sion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article, given the  
substantial overlap in the themes characterizing these debates, a cross-
commons analysis of policy innovations in the two very different do-
mains could yield important insights about the problem of the com-
mons generally. 
 
146 Lawrence Lessig argues that the Internet fits squarely within Carol Rose’s view 
that “some kinds of property . . . should be open to the public.”  LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 86 (2001) 
(quoting Rose, supra note 8, at 713).  According to Professor Lessig, the Internet was 
built upon two kinds of commons, and moved into a third, which resulted in an “in-
crease [in] the value of controlled resources by connecting them with free resources.”  
Id. at 85.  He also advances several reasons why he believes the commons of the Inter-
net should be regulated.  See id. at 85-99.  For an excellent, recent discussion of this 
problem, see Michael J. Madison et. al, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 
95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010), and the responses included in the volume. 
147 See generally JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:  ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF 
THE MIND 179-204 (2008); MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY:  HOW TOO 
MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 23-48 
(2008)  
148 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1-27 (2011) 
(discussing this debate and outlining a defense of intellectual property); Peter S. Men-
nell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 36 
(discussing the property rights debate in intellectual property). 
149 See, e.g., David F. Fahrenthold, SOPA Protests Shut Down Web Sites, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 18, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sopa-protests-to-
shut-down-web-sites/2012/01/17/gIQA4WYl6P_story.html (discussing various websites 
that protested proposed Internet privacy regulations). 
